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EDITORIAL
The euro-area recovery remains on track. 
The interim forecast recently published by 
the European Commission expects GDP 
growth to accelerate to 1.9% in 2006. This 
forecast is based on both a positive outlook 
for exports and – more significantly – on a 
progressive firming of domestic demand. 
The outlook for exports is positive partly 
because of improved cost competitiveness 
of the euro area, but also, and more 
importantly, because world trade is expected 
to continue to expand rapidly. This reflects 
high expected growth rates in major 
countries and regions such as China, Japan, 
the United States, Latin America and oil-
exporting countries.  
Regarding the prospects for domestic 
demand, the majority of recent indicators 
justify optimism. Most encouraging is the 
outlook for private investment which has 
been on a clear recovery since spring last 
year and should continue to expand in the 
months to come. In the case of private 
consumption, actual growth rates were 
lower than expected at the end of 2005. 
However, a revival of private consumption 
is expected in the course of this year as 
consumer confidence has been 
strengthening since the summer of 2005 and 
the outlook for employment is improving 
progressively.  
It is true that the GDP growth recorded in 
the fourth quarter of last year was relatively 
weak. However, this seems to be largely due 
to technical factors. As GDP grew above its 
potential rate in the third quarter, some 
reversal in the fourth quarter was quite 
likely. Moreover, GDP figures for some 
euro-area countries may have been distorted 
by incomplete working-day adjustments. It 
can therefore be expected that forthcoming 
hard data will trail the upward trend of the 
soft data, leading to a significant 
reacceleration of economic activity in the 
months to come.  
While current economic developments give 
grounds for optimism, it is important to 
bear in mind that economic policies play a 
vital role in determining the euro-area’s 
actual and potential growth performance. 
Sensible choices must be made in many 
different areas. In the context of this 
Quarterly Report, two areas are given 
explicit attention.  
First, some commentators have recently 
argued that the revival in consumer 
spending, which is crucial for the rebound 
of economic activity, hinges on a pick-up of 
wages. However, economic analysis shows 
that it has been employment growth rather 
than wage growth that has increasingly 
driven private consumption over the past 
decade. Therefore, if policy-makers want to 
stimulate private consumption in their 
countries, they should take measures to raise 
employment as part of the re-launched 
Lisbon strategy. In contrast, a policy of 
artificial wage rises may actually lower 
private consumption due to its negative 
effects on employment.  
Second, several euro-area Member States 
have lately experienced rapid increases in 
house prices and in household indebtedness. 
While there is no cause for concern at the 
level of the euro area as a whole, the 
situation in some Member States calls for a 
careful monitoring. Rapidly rising house 
prices can leave an economy vulnerable to a 
subsequent price correction with ensuing 
negative wealth effects. Irrespective of 
whether such a correction occurs or not, 
high levels of debt leave households 
vulnerable to adverse shocks to disposable 
income and interest rates. While the 
probability of these risks materialising 
remains low, if they do, they could hamper 
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growth. Moreover, the significant cross-
country differences in housing market 
developments observed in recent years have 
contributed to the persistence of growth 
differences between Member States and 
thereby can present important challenges to 
the smooth functioning of EMU.  
The question is, therefore, how policies 
should respond, bearing in mind that 
monetary policy can no longer be used at 
national level to control the growth of 
credit. Some general policy 
recommendations can be given here. 
An early policy response to an emerging 
housing market boom is the best approach 
as it averts a build-up of risk. If the housing 
market is already heated, then any policy 
response must be measured, so as to avoid 
the risk of actually triggering an abrupt price 
correction.  
Public statements should be used to remind 
private-sector agents of the existence of 
risks in the housing markets. Potential 
house buyers should be warned of the risks 
of possible overvaluation of the market and 
of overstretching themselves in terms of 
mortgage financing. Similarly, mortgage 
providers should be encouraged to exercise 
more caution in providing mortgage 
financing to clients and to take appropriate 
steps in prudential risk management when 
necessary.  
Fiscal policy should, as far as possible, be 
neutral towards the housing market. All 
policy-induced incentives to purchase 
housing – for example, tax breaks and 
mortgage subsidies – should be 
progressively withdrawn. Tighter fiscal 
policy is in any case also desirable for other 
reasons: it would improve the sustainability 
of public finances and could contribute 
towards a better policy mix.  
Finally, regulation needs to be reviewed to 
favour a better match between demand and 
supply of houses, and a better functioning 
and integration of mortgage markets. For 
instance, there is evidence that the current 
regulatory framework has caused 
construction activity in the euro area as a 
whole to react sluggishly to the house price 
increases in the last decade, although there 
are substantial differences between Member 
States. Regulatory changes which improve 
the capacity of housing supply to respond to 
price increases could thus reduce the 
volatility of house prices and the risk of 
bubbles forming.  
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
The latest reading of the national accounts for the euro area, which showed an unexpected slowdown of GDP growth between 
the third and the fourth quarter, should be interpreted with caution. Growth was above its potential rate in the third quarter 
and some reversal in the fourth quarter was likely. Moreover, GDP figures for some euro-area countries may have been 
distorted by incomplete working-day adjustments. Overall, the euro-area recovery remains on track. Strong gains in business 
surveys, with manufacturing confidence at its highest level in five years, point to a solid rebound of growth during the first 
quarter of this year. Recent indicators related to domestic demand are encouraging, particularly for corporate investment which 
has been on a clear path of recovery since the second quarter of last year. Notwithstanding persistently high oil prices, healthy 
growth in world trade and a progressive firming of domestic demand will support activity in the euro area during the next few 
quarters.  
Wage growth in the euro area has been particularly subdued in the past two years and is expected to remain so in 2006. In 
combination with persistent sluggishness in private consumption, these developments have led some commentators to conclude 
that a revival in consumer spending hinges on a pick-up of wages. However, an analysis of the respective contributions of 
wages and employment to consumer spending does not bear this conclusion out. Since the mid-1990s, growth in disposable 
income – the single most important determinant of consumption – has been dominated by employment growth with wage 
growth playing only a modest role. Furthermore, econometric analysis indicates that gains in disposable income underpinned by 
robust employment growth have a significantly bigger impact on consumer spending than those resulting from wage increases.  
The fast rise in house prices in the euro area since the late 1990s reflects strong demand pressures but also a sluggish supply 
response. Econometric evidence shows that the response of housing supply to changes in prices varies substantially from one 
Member States to another but tends to be weak for the euro area as a whole. Since the 1990s, this weakness of supply, which 
is probably caused by structural features of the housing market such as building and land-use regulations, has been aggravated 
by the oversupply which has depressed the German construction sector since the end of the unification boom. 
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
Subdued economic activity in the fourth 
quarter … 
The euro-area economy is currently benefiting 
from a very supportive environment. Growth in 
world output and trade is strong, due particularly 
to strong momentum in much of Asia. The 
euro/US dollar exchange rate has come down 
from its record high at the end of 2004 to a level 
which puts companies in the euro area in a more 
favourable competitive position. Oil prices, 
which surged at the turn of the year, have 
recently fallen and, while remaining high, are now 
at a level comparable to that of last autumn. The 
stance of the macroeconomic policy mix is 
broadly supportive to private sector demand. 
                                                     
1  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 21 March 2006. 
Given these conditions and the strong outcome 
in the third quarter, GDP growth in the euro area 
surprised on the downside in the last quarter of 
2005. According to the first estimate of the 
Quarterly National Accounts, the pace of 
economic expansion weakened from 0.7% in the 
third quarter to 0.3% in the fourth quarter, 
somewhat below market expectations and 0.1 pp 
lower than predicted in the European 
Commission's autumn 2005 economic forecasts. 
At the same time, growth in the previous 
quarters of 2005 was revised upwards, resulting 
in an average GDP growth of 1.3% for the year 
as a whole, as projected in the autumn forecast.  
The breakdown of expenditure shows that the 
slowdown of economic activity in the fourth 
quarter reflected both the negative impact of a 
fall in net foreign demand and the weakening of 
domestic demand, which was dragged down by a 
slight drop in consumption expenditure. 
However, investment continued to expand, albeit 
at a slightly slower pace. 
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…partly explained by technical factors 
The slowdown of economic activity in the euro 
area between the third and the fourth quarter of 
2005 should not be overstated. GDP growth 
accelerated markedly in the third quarter to an 
annualised pace of 2.7% – thus well above 
potential growth – so that some counter-
movement in the following quarter is not overly 
surprising. In addition, GDP figures for the 
second half of 2005 may have been distorted by 
incomplete adjustment of working-day effects 
due to substantial variations of working days in 
some euro-area countries. All in all, a large part 
of the deceleration in economic activity in the 
fourth quarter was of a technical nature and, as 
such, not particularly worrying. Furthermore, as 
first estimates of national accounts are prone to 
subsequent revisions, a cautious assessment of 
the low growth momentum seen in fourth-
quarter GDP numbers is warranted.  
In fact, the pattern displayed by the less volatile 
annual growth profiles indicates that underlying 
growth momentum at the end of last year was 
stronger than suggested by the quarter-on-
quarter GDP figure. On a year-on-year basis, 
GDP growth in the euro area continued to 
improve during 2005, accelerating from 1.2% in 
the first half of the year to 1.6% in the third 
quarter and edging up to 1.7% in the fourth 
quarter. Against the background of a major 
increase in oil prices, which rose by 45% in euro 
terms in 2005, this still is an improving, and 
rather atypical, performance for the region. 
Graph 1: GDP growth in selected euro-area countries 
(Quarter-on-quarter % changes in 2005) 
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(1) Excl. DE, ES, FR, NL and IT. 
Source: Commission services. 
The analysis of economic activity in the last 
months of 2005 is further complicated by the 
fact that GDP growth differed widely across 
euro-area countries during the last quarter, with 
weak activity in the largest economies dampening 
the outcome for the region as whole. On a 
quarter-on-quarter basis, economic activity 
contracted in Greece (-0.2%) and was flat in 
Germany (0.0%) and weak in France (0.2%), 
while strong activity was recorded in Austria 
(0.7%), Spain, Finland (0.9%) and the 
Netherlands (1%).2 
                                                     
2  No data are yet available for the fourth quarter for Italy.  
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2005 Q1 
2005 
Q2 
2005 
Q3 
2005 
Q4 
Carryover 
to 2006 2006 (2) 2007 (2) 
 % change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.6 1.9 (3)  2.1 
Private consumption 0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.2 0.2 1.4   1.9 
Government consumption 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.6 2.0 1.5 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.2 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.4 3.1   3.2 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.5   0.5 
Exports of goods and services -0.9 2.0 3.4 0.5 2.5 5.0   5.0 
Imports of goods and services -1.5 2.3 3.1 0.9 2.8 5.0   5.1 
 % contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.8   1.1 
Government consumption 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 
Changes in inventories 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0   
Net exports 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.1   0.1 0.0 
(1) Annual change in %.    (2) European Commission Autumn 2005 Forecasts. GDP growth.        (3) February 2006 Interim Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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The mixed hard data for Q4 contrast with 
upbeat surveys 
Another argument for interpreting the slowdown 
in quarter-on-quarter growth at the end of last 
year as a statistical blip is a continued and marked 
improvement in business survey data. According 
to the European Commission’s Survey, industrial 
confidence has risen almost uninterruptedly since 
mid-2005, marking no significant pause in the 
fourth quarter. In particular, production 
expectations and the assessment of order books 
have improved substantially. The Business 
Climate Indicator (BCI) has been above its long-
term average since September last year, reaching 
a five-year high in February 2006. Reuters PMI 
index of manufacturing activity in the euro area 
strengthened steadily in the last quarter of 2005 
and at the beginning of 2006. The index, 
currently standing at 54, indicates healthy 
expansion in the manufacturing sector. As to 
national business survey indicators, the German 
IFO business index increased in February to 
reach its highest level in 13 years. Since summer 
2005, both the future expectations and the 
current conditions of the index have posted 
strong increases. Finally, the manufacturing 
indicator of the National Bank of Belgium has 
been improving almost without interruption 
since April last year and the indicator is now back 
in positive territory, for the first time since mid-
2004.  
Survey data also point to improving economic 
conditions in the service sector, even though the 
recovery has so far been more muted in this 
sector than in manufacturing. Although it is still 
below its long-term average, the European 
Commission's service sector confidence index 
has shown a broad upward trend since March 
2005. Gains in the Reuters index for services 
have been more substantial in recent months. 
The indicator is well above the neutral level of 50 
and in February reached its highest level since 
October 2000. Since the third quarter of 2005, 
the improvement has been widespread across all 
components, including employment. 
Graph 2: Business confidence indicators, euro area 
(Balances in % – Mar 1999 to Feb 2006) 
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(1) The series is normalised (i.e. adjusted so as to have a means of 0 
and a standard deviation of 1). 
Source: Commission services. 
Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2005-2006 
 SENT. IND(1) BCI(2) OECD(3) PMI Man.(4) PMI Ser (5) IFO(6) NBB(7) ZEW(8) 
Long-term average 100.0 0.00 2.83 52.3 54.5 95.6   -9.5 32.7 
Trough in latest 
downturn 88.1 -1.25 -0.77 42.9 46.7 87.3 -26.5 -10.4 
March 2005 97.1 -0.12 0.2  50.4  53.0 95.3 -9.4 36.3 
April 2005 96.1 -0.31 -0.4  49.2  52.8 93.9 -15.9 20.1 
May 2005 96.0 -0.39 -0.6  48.7  53.5 92.8 -16.1 13.9 
June 2005 96.1 -0.30 -0.3  49.9  53.1 93.5 -14.4 19.5 
July 2005 97.2 -0.08 0.4  50.8  53.5 96.0 -13.8 37.0 
August 2005 97.4 -0.09 1.3  50.4  53.4 96.0 -14.1 50.0 
September 2005 98.5 0.06 2.1  51.7  54.7 96.6 -7.0 38.6 
October 2005 100.2 0.17 2.9  52.7  54.9 99.4 -6.0 39.4 
November 2005 99.7 0.13 3.6  52.8  55.2 98.4 -5.6 38.7 
December 2005 100.5 0.37 3.8  53.6  56.8 100.4 -0.8 61.6 
January 2006 101.5 0.34   53.5  57.0 103.8 -4.4 71.0 
February 2006 102.7 0.61   54.5  58.2 104.8 1.6 69.8 
March 2006           63.4 
(1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. (2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. (3) Composite leading indicator, six monthly 
change. (4) Reuters Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. (5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. (6) Business 
expectations, West Germany. (7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. (8) Business expectations of financial market 
analysts, Germany. 
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Box 1: Interpreting recent discrepancies between survey and hard data in the euro area 
 
Most business survey indicators for the euro area have been on an upward path since summer last year, a 
development which contrasts with downside surprises on some recent hard data.  Since the trough of the downturn 
in 2001, the euro area has experienced two short-lived mini recoveries of around 4-5 quarters (starting, respectively, 
early 2002 and during the first half of 2003) which have been followed by significant relapses in activity and 
confidence. Against such a background, the recent gap between surveys and hard data has raised some concerns 
about the solidity of the ongoing recovery. The present box argues that the gap can be explained by a number of 
technical (and temporary) factors and that surveys have recently sent more robust signals than during the mini 
recoveries of 2002 and 2003.  
 
ECFIN's business climate indicator (BCI) has increased substantially (by one standard deviation) since last spring 
and is now at its highest level in five years. Such a significant improvement seems a priori at odds with the slowdown 
in quarter-on-quarter growth registered in the last quarter of 2005 both for industrial production and GDP. There 
are, however, three reasons to downplay the importance of the recent discrepancy between hard and soft data.  
 
First, temporary differences in developments in hard and soft data are not unusual when looking at highly volatile 
quarter-on-quarter growth developments. Economic activity and survey indicators show a closer relation when 
growth is measured on a year-on-year basis. As shown in the left panel of the graph below, there was no significant 
gap between the two series in the last quarter of 2005 when changes in industrial production are measured year-on-
year. A more formal econometric equation linking y-o-y changes in industrial production to the BCI points to only a 
modest downside surprise in that quarter (with an actual reading of industrial growth of 2.1% against projected 
growth of 2.3% on the basis of the BCI data). Much larger temporary discrepancies between industrial production 
and manufacturing surveys were occasionally registered in the past.  
 
GDP, industrial production and the business 
climate indicator, euro area (2000Q1-2005Q4) 
GDP, actual and as projected with ECFIN's 
dynamic factor model  
(q-o-q changes in % – 2000Q1-2005Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. Source: Commission services. 
 
Second, DG ECFIN's dynamic factor model (DFM) points to an underestimation of GDP growth in the last quarter 
of 2005. The model allows to extract underlying common developments in economic activity in the euro area from 
about 2000 activity indicators and can be used to make short-term GDP projections. The projections made before 
the latest release of the national account data pointed to strong growth in the fourth quarter of 2005, at about 0.6% 
q-o-q against an estimate of 0.3% by Eurostat. In the past, such overestimations have proved to be a good leading 
indicator of subsequent upward revisions of GDP growth by Eurostat (see Grenouilleau 2006). It is also noteworthy 
that the DFM points to robust GDP growth in the fourth quarter whether survey data are included in the underlying 
data set or not (see right panel of graph above). In other words, Eurostat's relatively weak GDP data for the last 
quarter of 2005 contrasts with the more upbeat picture provided by surveys but also by most other activity 
indicators.  
 
Finally, calendar effects seem to have contributed to the underestimation of GDP and industrial production data in 
some Member States in the last quarter of 2005. The calculation of seasonally adjusted data was complicated by the 
fact that Christmas fell on a Sunday, inducing some households to take additional holidays (a phenomenon that is 
difficult to estimate statistically). As a result, the deceleration of activity in the fourth quarter is likely to be followed 
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by stronger-than-expected growth in the first quarter of 2006. Such a pattern was indeed observed in 2004 when 
Christmas also fell on a weekend (see Goldman Sachs 2006).  
 
The expectations gap in the euro-area 
manufacturing survey  
(Jan 2000-Feb 2006) 
Confidence in the construction sector  
(Jan 2000-Feb 2006) 
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(1) The expectations gap is calculated as the difference between 
manufacturing companies' production expectations and their 
assessment of past production trends.  
Source: Commission services. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
It is also worth stressing that some recent developments in confidence indicators suggest that the ongoing recovery 
might be on a somewhat firmer footing than the two mini-recoveries of 2002 and 2003. First, companies' 
expectations and assessment of the current situation have moved in tandem in the past months whereas 
improvements in confidence in 2002 and 2003 were, in their initial stages, mostly driven by expectations (see left 
panel of graph above). Second, the current recovery is characterised by a synchronised and fairly sustained upturn in 
all major sectors for which confidence is measured (manufacturing, services, households, retail and construction). 
This was not the case in 2002 and 2003 when, for instance, confidence in the construction sector remained weak (see 
right panel of graph above) or the recovery in the retail sector was limited.  
 
References 
(1) Goldman Sachs European Weekly Analysts No. 06/10, March 9 2006.  
(2) Grenouilleau, D. (2006), 'The stacked leading indicators dynamic factor model: a sensitivity analysis of forecast accuracy using 
the bootstrap', forthcoming Economic Paper, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
Signals from domestic demand remain 
broadly encouraging… 
A comforting development in the latest national 
account data was the continuation of the 
investment recovery. Gross fixed capital 
formation grew by 0.8% in the last three months 
of the year, down from 1.1% in the third quarter. 
Despite the slight slowdown in the fourth 
quarter, the underlying momentum of capital 
spending remained healthy, as shown by the 
acceleration of annual growth from 1.2% in the 
first quarter of 2005 to 3.2% in the last quarter. 
Besides a marked strengthening of business 
confidence, several factors should support the 
ongoing recovery of corporate investment in the 
months to come. Disregarding erratic month-to-
month fluctuations, data on industrial activity 
point to a pick-up in momentum. The year-on-
year growth rate of industrial production 
increased throughout 2005, rising from 0.6% in 
the first quarter to 1.8% in the fourth quarter. 
On the financing side, the annual growth rate of 
loans to non-financial corporations rose from 
7% in the third quarter to 7.5% in the fourth, 
thus continuing the upward trend observed since 
early 2004. Finally, industrial new orders picked 
up noticeably at the end of last year, suggesting 
demand pressures are increasing in the 
investment sector.  
The positive outlook for investment is not 
limited to the equipment sector. After an 
unexpected fall in December 2005, confidence in 
the construction sector resumed the upward 
trend followed since summer 2005. The current 
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level of the index is well above its long-term 
average. 
Inventory accumulation added 0.4 pp to GDP 
growth in the fourth quarter. The reasons for the 
strong inventory accumulation in the fourth 
quarter are difficult to assess. On the one hand, it 
may reflect the accumulation by firms of unsold 
goods as a consequence of the unanticipated 
slowdown in demand. On the other hand, 
inventories are a volatile component of demand 
and this figure is likely to be typically revised to 
more “normal” levels in successive estimates of 
Quarterly National Accounts. An argument 
supporting the second interpretation is that 
business surveys have not signalled any 
deterioration in the assessment of companies' 
stock levels.  
In contrast to investment, fourth quarter data on 
consumption were disappointing. Private 
consumption expenditure contracted by 0.2%, 
down from an upwardly revised 0.5% in the third 
quarter. Hence, the contribution of private 
consumption to GDP growth turned negative in 
the last quarter of 2005, interrupting the 
moderate but steady improvements in the first 
three quarters of the year. Similarly, on the back 
of a significant contraction in public spending in 
Germany and a substantial deceleration in 
France, public consumption was unchanged in 
the fourth quarter, compared to a 0.9% increase 
in the third quarter.  
Graph 3: Consumer confidence, euro area 
(Balances in % – Mar 1999 to Feb 2006) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The drop in private consumption in the fourth 
quarter is at odds with developments in 
consumer surveys. After the temporary dip 
during the first half of 2005, consumer 
confidence has shown signs of improvement 
since summer 2005. The indicator of consumer 
sentiment moved above its long-term average in 
December of last year and is now back to a level 
last reached in 2002. The strengthening of 
confidence among consumers largely reflects 
improved expectations about economic growth 
and reduced concerns about unemployment. 
Confidence in the retail sector, on the other 
hand, remained broadly stable in the fourth 
quarter and the beginning of 2006, after having 
improved sharply in he third quarter of 2005. On 
a more positive note, the volume of retail trade 
as measured by Eurostat increased again in 
January after having stagnated in November and 
December. German retail data, which in recent 
months have been volatile, explain most of this 
rebound.  
Developments in wages and, more critically, the 
labour market are important for the recovery of 
household spending and the solidity of the 
rebound of economic activity in the euro area. 
Wage indicators suggest that wages have not 
accelerated and are still expanding at the 
moderate pace observed in the last two years. In 
addition, following the delayed impact of rising 
oil prices, consumer spending was affected by the 
acceleration of headline inflation from 2% to 
2.3% between the first and the second half of 
2005, which reduced households' purchasing 
power. 
When assessing the outlook for consumption, it 
is important to bear in mind that employment is 
a more significant determinant of consumer 
spending than wages (Section 2 below provides 
econometric evidence supporting this 
conclusion). In this respect it is encouraging to 
note that there was some, albeit limited, 
improvement in labour market conditions during 
2005. The level of employment remained broadly 
flat during the first half of the year but 
employment growth then accelerated to 0.2% in 
the third quarter. Meanwhile, the unemployment 
rate fell steadily from 8.8% in April 2005 to 8.3% 
in October – though this downward movement 
is partly explained by statistical effects linked to 
reforms implemented in Germany and France. 
Since October, the unemployment rate has 
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remained broadly stable. However, recent survey 
data have shown a mildly positive outlook for the 
labour market. For instance, the employment 
component of the composite PMI indicator 
moved above the 50-mark separating expansion 
from contraction in the fourth quarter of 2005, 
and strengthened further at the beginning of 
2006.  
… while the outlook for exports continues to 
be upbeat 
Growth in euro-area exports decelerated to 0.5% 
in the fourth quarter, down from 3.4% in the 
previous quarter. Given the volatility of trade 
data, a statistical adjustment following the strong 
performance of exports in the previous quarter is 
probably the main explanation of this 
development. In addition, as exports include 
intra-euro-area trade, the slowdown in the fourth 
quarter may partly reflect weak output growth. 
The parallel, albeit less pronounced, deceleration 
of import growth from 3.1% in the third quarter 
to 0.9% in the fourth supports this observation. 
Indeed, most indicators that are typically well 
correlated with extra-euro-area trade are 
consistent with continuous strong foreign 
demand in the euro area. World trade was up by 
a healthy 2.8% in the fourth quarter, according to 
the latest CPB release. The indicators for export 
expectations of the quarterly “World Economic 
Survey” was stronger in the fourth quarter than 
in any previous quarter of 2005. The cost-
competitiveness of the euro area, as measured by 
the real effective exchange rate (based on unit 
labour costs) has been improving since early 
2005 and recorded a gain of about 1% in the last 
quarter of 2005.  
Recent indicators point to a strong rebound 
of economic activity in the first quarter  
Notwithstanding the slowdown in the fourth 
quarter of 2005, economic activity in the euro 
area is expected to bounce back in the first 
quarter of 2006 and to gather momentum in the 
course of the year, owing to brisk global growth 
combined with a broadly supportive policy mix. 
According to the European Commission's 
February 2006 interim forecast, GDP growth is 
projected to reach 1.9% in 2006.3  
Graph 4: The short-term outlook for euro-area GDP 
growth (Q-o-q changes in % – 1999Q1 to 2006Q2) 
0.4
0.9
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Forecast 
ranges (1)
 
(1) Dynamic Factor Model. 
Source: Commission services. 
The main contribution to growth should come 
from domestic demand combined with a small 
but positive contribution from net foreign 
demand. Private investment, in particular, should 
be boosted by optimistic demand expectations, 
improved balance sheets and continued 
favourable financing conditions. The recovery of 
consumer spending should be more gradual, in 
line with expected improvements in the labour 
market and rising confidence.  
Since the publication of the interim forecast, 
survey data have continued to be upbeat, 
suggesting that GDP growth in the euro area 
may surprise on the upside in the short term. 
This is at least the message sent by the updated 
quarterly GDP growth projections for the euro 
area derived from DG ECFIN’s Dynamic Factor 
                                                     
3  Starting this year, the Commission will present interim 
forecasts twice a year. The interim forecasts update the 
comprehensive bi-annual forecasts presented in the spring 
and the autumn, the purpose being to improve economic 
surveillance in the EU and the euro area and to verify to 
what extent the recent fully-fledged forecasts are still on 
track. The interim forecasts, however, are much more 
partial in nature and coverage. They update the GDP 
growth and inflation outlook for the five largest EU 
Member States, i.e. Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the 
UK, as well as the euro area and the EU, for the current 
year. The complete document of the February 2006 
interim forecast can be found at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/act
ivities/activities_keyindicatorsforecasts_en.htm.  
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Model (DFM).4 According to the model, quarter-
on-quarter GDP growth for the euro area is 
projected to be in a range of 0.4% to 0.9% in the 
first two quarters of 2006. 
Risks to the growth outlook 
Despite the projection of a gradual return to 
potential growth during 2006, the outlook is 
subject to some risks and uncertainties linked to 
the international environment and domestic 
demand. 
Regarding the international environment, the rise 
in oil prices during 2005 and early 2006 resulted 
not only from rising demand in the USA, China 
and India, but also from supply problems in the 
Middle East, Nigeria, Russia, and the Gulf of 
Mexico. As a consequence of this tight balance 
between demand and supply, oil prices have 
become more volatile and any significant further 
rise in oil prices would dampen euro-area growth. 
Large current-account imbalances remain in the 
world economy, creating increasing strains on the 
global financial system. A disorderly unwinding 
of these imbalances and a significant fall in the 
dollar exchange rate against the euro would 
undermine economic activity in the euro area. 
Global growth could also be derailed by fresh 
geopolitical shocks. Increasing tensions in the 
Middle East and elsewhere could, for example, 
result in rising commodity prices. There is also a 
specific concern related to a possible global 
pandemic if the 'avian flu' spreads more widely 
within the human population.  
While the downside risks are clearly significant, 
there is also the possibility that global growth 
would re-accelerate if oil prices were to fall 
significantly or geopolitical turbulences to abate 
substantially. 
On the domestic side, a fall in inflation helped by 
lower oil prices may boost private consumption, 
so far the missing link of the recovery in the euro 
area. A significant increase in consumer 
confidence as political uncertainties about the 
                                                     
4  The DFM model distils most recent updated information 
from hard and survey data of about two thousand time 
series. See Quarterly Report on the Euro Area Vol. 4, 
No. 4, 2005, Box 1, p 10, for an explanation of the DFM. 
implementation of structural reforms ease would 
also provide additional support to domestic 
demand and overall growth in the euro area. 
A stronger recovery than envisaged in the 
autumn and interim forecast over the next two 
years cannot be ruled out if the euro area can 
build on the significant improvement in business 
confidence, boosting employment and 
supporting a stronger-than-expected revival in 
domestic demand. 
World growth remains strong 
The global economy gained some momentum in 
the second half of 2005, which is also reflected in 
the continuing gradual strengthening of world 
trade. The year-on-year rate of increase of the 
world trade indicator compiled by the CPB has 
risen from a low of 4.7% in April to above 8% in 
December 2005, the latest month for which data 
is available (Graph 5). The global economy has 
so far managed to grow rapidly, despite oil prices 
remaining above US$60 per barrel for a 
prolonged period. 
Graph 5: World trade 
(Y-o-y % changes in volume – Jan 2000 to Dec 2005) 
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Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis. 
The US economy registered annual GDP 
growth of 3.5% in 2005. Relatively low growth in 
the fourth quarter (1.6% annualised according to 
the preliminary estimate) was not the result of a 
fundamental weakening of the expansion, but 
due to volatility in car sales and defence spending 
and hurricane-related output disruptions. Recent 
data point to solid growth in the first quarter of 
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2006, again mainly fuelled by consumer 
spending, but also by the inventory cycle and 
hurricane-rebuilding. Later this year, the 
economy is expected to slow down in response 
to rising interest rates and a downturn in the 
housing market. A moderation in house price 
inflation may already be under way. Employment 
continues to increase around a 1.5% annual 
growth trend and the unemployment rate fell to 
4.8% in February. Headline inflation has shown 
some volatility in response to energy price 
developments, but core inflation has remained 
stable around 2%. The trade balance has 
worsened again since September, which has 
resulted in an overall trade deficit of 5.8% of 
GDP in 2005 while the current account deficit 
has increased to 6.4% of GDP. Last year’s 
general government fiscal deficit can be 
estimated at 3.9% of GDP. The Federal Reserve 
raised the federal funds target rate to 4.5% at the 
end of January and announced that some further 
firming of monetary policy may be needed. 
Longer-term interest rates have also continued to 
drift upwards and the yield curve remains almost 
flat. 
The economic expansion in Japan is broadening 
beyond the export-related sector. In the last 
quarter of 2005, GDP growth reached 5.5% 
(quarter-on-quarter at an annualised rate). The 
main engine of growth was private domestic 
demand, notably household consumption and 
investment, but net exports also contributed. For 
the year as a whole, GDP growth reached 2.8%. 
The Japanese economy is expected to continue 
expanding at a similar pace in 2006, based on a 
continued favourable external environment and 
domestic demand maintaining its current 
momentum. On the price front, in January 2006, 
both headline and core inflation reached 0.5% 
year-on-year and core inflation should remain 
positive for the year as a whole. However, there 
are still some uncertainties about whether the 
deflation as come to a definitive end. In this 
context, the Bank of Japan is likely to be cautious 
when taking any steps towards a tighter monetary 
stance.  
China's GDP was revised upwards in December 
2005, mainly due to an upward revision of the 
size of the service sector. GDP growth in 2005 is 
now officially estimated at 9.9%. The very robust 
2005 GDP growth rate was underpinned by still 
high investment spending and surging net 
exports. GDP growth is expected to moderate 
modestly to slightly over 9% in 2006, mainly due 
to a reduction of net export growth. The growth 
momentum in the rest of Asia picked up in the 
second half of 2005 on the back of strong 
external demand. It is expected to moderate 
somewhat in 2006 in tandem with the expected 
gradual growth deceleration in China and the 
USA, but to remain robust thanks to buoyant 
domestic demand.  
Growth in Latin America remained solid in 2005, 
although moderating somewhat as monetary 
tightening took its toll on domestic demand. 
With continued favourable external conditions 
and monetary policy having started to ease again 
in some countries, growth should remain around 
4% in 2006. The high price of oil should sustain 
growth in oil-exporting countries, such as those 
in the Commonwealth of Independent States and 
the Middle East, where growth is expected to 
reach about 6% and 5% respectively this year. 
Monetary and financial conditions  
Monetary conditions in the euro area, as 
measured by the Monetary Conditions Index 
(MCI), have remained accommodative over the 
last months. The impact of the exchange rate 
depreciation and the increase in short-term 
interest rates have cancelled each other out.  
Graph 6: The euro-area MCI and its contributors  
(Inverted scale – Jan 1999 to Feb 2006) 
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Source: Commission services. 
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On 2 March, the ECB increased its policy rates 
again by 25 basis points, bringing its main policy 
rate to 2.5%. The main reasons for the interest 
rate hikes were the upside risks to price stability 
indicated by both the economic and monetary 
analysis. The rate hike should help anchor 
medium- to long-term inflation expectations. 
Despite the two rate hikes since December 2005, 
nominal and real short-term interest rates remain 
exceptionally low by historical standards. 
Financial market expectations as derived from 
futures contracts are pricing in a next rate hike by 
25 basis points in the second quarter and another 
hike by 25 basis points before the end of the 
year. High probability is also given to another 
hike in the first half of 2007. This would bring 
the ECB’s policy rate to 3.25%. 
Graph 7: 10- year government bond yields  
(Daily data, in % – 1 Jan 2003 to 21 March 2006) 
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Source: Ecowin. 
In the period leading to the ECB rate hike 
decision, bond markets experienced a strong 
downward price correction, bringing bond yields 
up to around 3.7%, from a historical low of 3% 
in September. The driving forces behind the 
upturn of government bond yields in the euro 
area were positive data releases, the two interest 
rate hikes, and hawkish comments from several 
Governing Council members, fuelling further 
rate hike speculations. In the USA, the pick-up in 
bond yields was mainly driven by strong US 
economic figures for January and some further 
monetary policy tightening. 
Since early October, the euro-dollar exchange 
rate has fluctuated within a relatively narrow 
range around 1.20 USD/EUR. Market 
expectations about the course of monetary policy 
in the USA and the euro area continued to be the 
main determinant of movements within this 
range. In December and January, expectations 
that an end of the Fed tightening cycle would 
come to an end on the one hand and 
speculations about ECB interest rate hikes on the 
other hand led to an appreciation of the euro 
exchange rate by some 5%, from 1.17 
USD/EUR to slightly below 1.23 USD/EUR. 
Following Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s first 
Congressional testimony on 15 February and 
some strong US data, market expectations about 
further Fed increases were fuelled and brought 
the euro-dollar exchange rate back to a level 
slightly below 1.20 USD/EUR. Since then, the 
dollar-euro exchange rate has remained broadly 
stable. 
Graph 8: Euro exchange rates 
(Daily data – 1 Jan 2003 to 21 March 2006) 
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Source: Commission services and Ecowin. 
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2. The respective roles of employment 
and wages in supporting household 
consumption  
The weakness of domestic demand in the euro 
area over the past few years has spurred a 
discussion about whether low wage growth has 
held back private consumption. Indeed, real 
compensation per employee grew on average by 
only 0.2% per annum in 2002-05. Over the same 
period, private consumption expanded by a 
disappointing annual average of 1.6% in constant 
prices. Real compensation growth is estimated to 
have been negative in 2005, with private 
consumption growth reaching just 1.5%. For 
2006, the Commission autumn 2005 forecast 
points to a further year of negative real wage 
growth.  
Graph 9: A stylised view of the link between wages, 
employment and aggregate demand components 
Source: Commission services. 
There are some analysts who argue that any 
rebound in private consumption will necessitate 
stronger increases in wages than witnessed in the 
recent past. This notion is contentious because 
even if higher wage growth has the potential to 
stimulate private consumption, it would 
simultaneously increase labour costs and possibly 
depress employment, with adverse consequences 
for household consumption. Graph 9 shows the 
main interactions between wages, employment 
and aggregate demand. Solid arrows denote 
positive and dotted arrows negative relations. 
Higher wages lead to an increase in private 
consumption, which in turn causes firms to 
invest and hire more via its effect on aggregate 
demand. However, for wage increases to 
stimulate overall economic activity, this positive 
demand effect would need to be stronger than 
the negative effect of rising labour costs on 
employment, investment and external 
competitiveness. Thus employment and 
investment would need to be weakly responsive 
to wages. Moreover, the economy would need to 
be relatively closed to external trade so that the 
negative impact of higher labour costs on 
external competitiveness and external demand 
does not play too strong an offsetting role.  
The central interest of this note is in the bold 
arrows of Graph 9, i.e. the relative strength of 
real wages and employment as determinants of 
private consumption. Thus, the link between real 
wages and investment, external demand and 
employment is not addressed in the analysis 
below, which focuses rather on the questions of 
whether low real wage growth automatically 
translates into low growth in private 
consumption or whether employment has an 
offsetting role in the event of low wage growth. 
The link between the wage bill, disposable 
income and consumption in the euro area 
In modern economic theory, the relationship 
between the wage bill – i.e. the product of 
employment and wage per person employed – 
and consumption is somewhat ambiguous. In 
general, economic theory posits that private 
consumption is determined by permanent rather 
than temporary changes in disposable income. 
Current employment and labour income have 
relatively little influence on actual consumption. 
Changes in disposable income have an impact on 
consumption only under special circumstances, 
for instance, if they are perceived as indicating a 
change in permanent income or if households are 
subject to liquidity constraints.  
Nevertheless, despite these theoretical caveats, 
empirical research usually finds that disposable 
income is the single most important determinant 
of private consumption and labour income 
constitutes the most important part of disposable 
income.  
Growth in gross disposable income, the total 
wage bill and private consumption has moved 
close together over the cycle in the euro area (see 
Graph 10). The strong linkage between 
disposable income and private consumption is 
Private 
consumption 
Real wage 
Aggregate 
demand 
Employment Investment, 
external 
demand 
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also evidenced by the estimates of the 
consumption function presented in the Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area I-2003. They yielded a 
long-term elasticity of 1.05, meaning that changes 
in disposable income translate almost 1:1 into 
corresponding changes in private consumption.5 
These consumption equation also showed that 
disposable income mattered more for the decline 
in consumption in 2000-03 than other 
fundamental determinants such as wealth. 
Graph 10: Households’ real income and real 
consumption (Annual changes in % – 1992-2004) (1) 
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(1) EUR-6, consisting of BE, DE, FR, IT, NL, FI. 
Source: Commission services. 
Graph 11 presents the decomposition of 
household’s disposable income into labour 
income, non-labour income and re-distribution 
in 2005. It shows that the labour income of both 
employees and the self-employed amounts to 
more than two third of households’ gross 
disposable income.6 Non-labour income, which 
is the sum of net property income (interest, 
distributed income of corporations and rents) 
and gross operating surplus makes up 27% of 
gross disposable income.7 The residual term 
                                                     
5  For estimates of consumption functions for Germany and 
France, see Orellana, M., Paternoster, D. and S., SØrensen 
(2005), 'Consumption, investment and saving in the euro 
area: an assessment', European Economy Occasional 
Paper No 20. 
 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publicatio
ns/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers20_en.htm. 
6  The average labour income of each self-employed person 
is estimated to be equal to the average compensation per 
employee and deducted from the gross operating surplus 
and mixed income' aggregate.  
7  The gross operating surplus is a measure of the profits 
derived from the activity of self-employed persons. 
captures the net redistribution between the 
government and households, i.e. current taxes on 
income and wealth etc., social contributions and 
benefits, and current transfers.  
Graph 11: Composition of households’ gross disposable 
income 2005 (1) 
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(1) Euro area excluding IE, LU and PT. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 12: Contribution to changes in the gross 
disposable income of households at current prices  
(Annual changes in % – 1996-2005) (1) 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Wages and salaries Labour income of self-employed
Net re-distribution Non-labour income
 
(1) Euro area excluding IE, LU and PT. 
Source: Commission services. 
Can households expect any deterioration in 
labour income in a cyclical slowdown to be at 
least partially offset by rising non-labour income? 
Graph 12 reveals that the contribution of total 
labour income to households’ disposable income 
growth has followed a pro-cyclical pattern, being 
strong in 1999/2000 and weaker since then. A 
reduction in the wage bill implies an increase in 
corporate profits, which could be re-distributed 
to households in the form of capital income. 
However, there appears to be little evidence of 
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such an offsetting effect. Both components of 
non-labour income, i.e. net property income and 
households’ gross operating surplus, seem to 
move with rather than counter to the business 
cycle. As a result, they do not offer a cushion if 
labour income should fall during cyclical 
slowdowns. It is rather social security payments 
that have played this role, as evidenced by a 
counter-cyclical contribution of net re-
distribution to disposable income.  
The breakdown of labour income into real 
wages and employment 
Though the wage bill is regarded as a key 
determinant of households’ disposable income 
and thus of private consumption, the respective 
contributions of the wage rate and employment 
components has hardly been analysed. Empirical 
analysis tends to focus on the propensity to 
consume out of disposable income and out of 
wealth, typically finding that the elasticity with 
respect to wealth is the much smaller of the two.8 
In theory, the marginal propensity to consume 
out of a change in wages or a change in 
employment can be expected to be dissimilar if 
people perceive one component to be more 
permanent than the other. Furthermore, people 
entering into employment may increase their 
consumption by more than those that are granted 
a pay increase, which may lead to changes in the 
aggregate level of consumption irrespective of 
changes in the total wage bill.9 
Two findings emerge from the decomposition of 
the contribution of employment and real wage 
growth to the growth of the real wage bill in the 
euro area for the 1996-2005 period (Graph13).  
¾ First, growth in the total wage bill was mainly 
driven by job creation during that period.  
                                                     
8  See Barrel, R. and E.E. Davis (2004), 'Consumption, 
financial and real wealth in the G-5', NIESR Discussion 
Paper No 232; Dreger, C. and H.E. Reimers (2003), 
'Consumption and income in the euro area: Empirical 
evidence based on panel cointegration methods', Institut 
für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle Working Paper No 139. 
9  Differences may also arise from the fact the changes in 
employment and wages may not have the same impact on 
household liquidity constraints. Entering employment 
may entail a more substantial easing of liquidity 
constraints than getting a wage increase.  
¾ Second, years with high employment growth 
were also years with high growth in private 
consumption. The same cannot be said for 
the relationship between real wage growth 
and private consumption, which display a 
much weaker correlation for the 1996-2005 
period and even a slightly negative correlation 
for the 2001-05 period. 
Graph 13: Contribution of employment and real wages 
to the real wage bill, euro area  
(Annual changes in % – 1992-2005) (1) 
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(1) Compensation includes wages, salaries and employers’ 
contribution to social security. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 14: Contribution of employment and real wages 
to consumption, euro-area Member States,  
(Average annual growth in % – 2001-05) (1) 
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(1) Compensation includes wages, salaries and employers’ 
contribution to social security. 
Source: Commission services. 
A higher correlation of consumption with 
employment than with wages is also visible at the 
level of the individual euro-area Member States. 
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Graph 14 suggests that a high increase in a 
country's real wage bill did not mechanically 
translate into high private consumption growth 
in 2001-05. Remarkably, some countries recorded 
relatively vibrant private consumption despite 
negative real wage growth. In these countries, 
high private consumption growth went along 
with relatively strong employment growth. This 
seems to indicate that differences in labour 
market conditions matter more than differences 
in real pay in explaining differences in 
consumption growth. The fact that a strong 
correlation exists between consumer confidence 
and unemployment also lends credence to this 
assessment (Graph 15). 
Graph 15: Consumer confidence and annual change in 
the rate of unemployment, euro area 
(Monthly data – Jan 1994 - Nov 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
An empirical consumption function, in which 
both employment and real wages are entered as 
separate independent variables and real private 
consumption growth as a dependent variable, 
provides further support for the argument that 
employment plays a more important role than 
wages in determining private consumption 
spending. The estimates presented in Table 3 are 
obtained from a panel of annual data of the 
12 euro-area Member States covering the 1970-
2005 period. The high coefficient of the 
employment variable suggests that employment 
is significantly more important for consumption 
growth than wages. Several models were 
estimated. In the simplest model (row Ia), the 
elasticity of consumption with respect to 
employment is 0.8 and the elasticity of 
consumption with respect to wages is only 0.2. 
The comparison of the estimates from the 1990s 
onwards with those covering the period 1970-
2005 also suggest that the elasticity of 
consumption with respect to employment may 
have increased somewhat over time.  
The coefficients are robust to different variations 
of the model. For instance, the introduction of 
an error-correction term or estimation without 
fixed effects hardly changes the coefficients. The 
basic result of a higher elasticity for employment 
than for wages is also robust to the inclusion of 
further variables (non-labour income, financial 
and housing wealth, interest rates). It also holds 
if countries are estimated individually with annual 
data.10  
A more serious methodological concern is that 
wages and employment are not exogenous 
variables. Endogeneity may cause the estimates 
to be biased, i.e. the estimated coefficients do not 
reflect their true value. However, the use of more 
sophisticated estimation methods taking the 
potential endogeneity problem into account 
(instrumental variable methods) confirms the 
conclusion that consumption is more responsive 
to employment than to wages. 
Finally, it should also be noted that the estimates 
should not suffer from multi-collinearity because 
there is limited coincident correlation between 
real wage growth and employment growth. The 
coefficient of correlation is -0.03 for the entire 
sample. It increases if employment growth is 
lagged with respect to real wage growth.  
Consumption in times of negative real wage 
growth 
It is interesting to examine how private 
consumption has developed in periods of 
negative real wage growth. Negative real wage 
growth has not been exceptional in the euro-area 
Member States over the few last years. Every 
single year since the early 1990s at least one 
Member State has recorded negative real wage 
growth. For instance, Belgium, Spain, Austria 
and Finland registered negative real wage growth 
in 2000, notwithstanding the rapid GDP growth 
registered that year. And periods of negative real 
wage growth were not restricted to just a few 
                                                     
10  Except for Germany and Greece in the long sample and 
Finland in the short sample. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 19 - 
countries. France is in fact the only country in 
the euro area where real wage growth was 
positive every year between 1990 and 2005. Out 
of the 192 data points of annual wage growth 
available for the 1990-2005 period (16 years × 12 
Member States), there are 48 observations of 
annual negative real wage growth (i.e. 25% of the 
total sample). During these years of negative real 
wage growth, real consumption grew on average 
by 1.7% (see Graph 16). In years of positive real 
wage growth it was 2.6%.  
The households’ saving ratio, meanwhile, 
declined on average by 0.6 pp in years of negative 
real wage growth as opposed to by 0.3 pp in 
'normal' years. Thus, when real wage growth was 
negative households’ consumption was 
supported by a considerable reduction in 
households’ savings ratio. 
 
Graph 16: Consumption during periods of negative and 
positive wage growth, euro-area Member States  
(Average annual changes in % – 1990-2005) (1) 
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(1) Averages calculated by decomposing the sample of 192 
observations (12 countries × 16 years) into two sub-samples 
(years of negative wage growth and years of positive wage 
growth). IE and PT are excluded in the case of the savings ratio. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Table 3: Estimation of a consumption function, 12 euro-area Member States 
(Endogenous variable: growth in real private consumption) (1) 
    
Constant Real wage growth 
Employment 
growth 
Error 
correction 
term (lag 1) 
Adj. R2 Durbin-Watson 
0.012 0.212 0.787  0.75 1.88 (Ia) OLS 
1990-2005 (9.90) (4.48) (18.11)     
0.016 0.321 0.687  0.59 1.95 (Ib) OLS 
1970-2005 (14.88) (9.30) (15.75)     
0.011 0.248 0.805 -0.109 0.76 1.78 (IIa) E-C  
1990-2005 (9.42) (5.14) (18.67) (-2.74)    
0.016 0.347 0.697 -0.100 0.61 1.86 (IIb) E-C 
1970-2005 (14.49) (10.07) (16.27) (-4.03)    
0.010 0.297 0.897  0.73 1.97 (IIIa) IV  
1990-2005 (5.16) (2.74) (15.38)     
0.012 0. 449 0.834  0.56 2.02 (IIIb) IV 1970-2005 (5.79) (4.34) (13.43)     
(1) t-values in brackets. The estimates include time and country-fixed effects. LN: natural logarithm. OLS = ordinary least squares, E-C = 
error correction with the long-term relationship LN(Consumption) = -2.7 + 0.643 * LN(Real wage* Employment) + 0.1 Dummy [1 
for Germany after 1991, 0 else] (including time and country-fixed effects), IV 2-stage least squares with lagged real wage growth, 
lagged employment growth, lagged TFP growth, export growth, and working-age population growth used as instruments. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Conclusions 
Labour income is a key determinant of private 
consumption in the euro area. When labour 
income is decomposed into its main 
determinants, we see that private consumption 
has increasingly been driven by employment 
growth rather than by wage growth over the past 
decade. This finding reflects both strong 
employment creation in a context of continued 
wage moderation and a stronger incidence of 
employment than wages on private consumption. 
In order to strengthen private consumption, it 
will therefore be paramount to create conditions 
for higher employment.  
3.  The weak response of housing supply 
to surging prices 
Stylised facts 
Euro-area real house prices have risen at a strong 
pace since the late 1990s, although the pattern 
has differed significantly across countries 
(Graph 17). In the wake of this price increase, a 
broad literature has developed on the interaction 
between the housing market and the business 
cycle.11 Much of the discussion has focused on 
the interaction between house prices, monetary 
policy and private consumption, which takes 
place via income effects, wealth effects and the 
use of real estate as credit collateral. By contrast, 
the impact of higher house prices on 
construction activity has attracted relatively little 
attention. Yet one remarkable aspect of the 
present boom in housing demand in the euro 
area is, however, that it does not appear to have 
been accompanied by a very strong increase in 
construction activity.  
Graph 17: Real house price developments, euro-area 
Member States (change in % – 1999-2004) (1) 
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(1) CPI- deflated. 
Source: Commission services, ECB, NIESR. 
Historically, a very high degree of co-movement 
can be observed between the business cycle, the 
cyclical component of house prices and housing 
construction in the euro area (Graph 18). Until 
the end of the 1990s this relationship was fairly 
stable. In a stylized way, house price cycles 
followed the output gap by about 1 year. In the 
                                                     
11  QREA Vol. 4 N°2 (2005) Focus: Housing markets and 
the business cycle in the euro area.  
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same vein, the residential construction cycle 
followed the housing price cycle by about 1 year 
and the output gap by 1-2 years. 
Graph 18: House price cycle, residential construction 
cycle and output gap, Euro area  
(Deviation from trend in % – 1976-2004) (1) 
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(1) House prices and residential construction are detrended with a 
linear filter. 
Source: Commission services. 
However, this relationship appears to have 
broken down since roughly 2000. In recent years, 
house prices have continued to rise at a pace 
above trend levels, while both construction and 
economic activity have remained below trend 
levels. Essentially, the house price and 
construction cycle appear to have decoupled. 
And the construction cycle, in turn, appears to be 
leading the output gap rather than follow it.  
Consumption versus investment cycles 
This decoupling of the house price cycle and the 
construction cycle is clearly important in 
understanding present cyclical developments. In 
addition, the magnitude of the residential 
housing supply response has important 
implications for the development of the euro-
area business cycle and the transmission of 
monetary policy. Let's illustrate this by imagining 
two extreme supply responses to higher demand 
for housing.  
Pure price response: In this case, the price 
elasticity of housing is perfectly inelastic with no 
real economy response whatsoever in terms of 
increased investment activity or increased 
housing services. The economic impact of higher 
prices would be limited to the private 
consumption side, where higher house prices 
serve as collateral for loans and trigger wealth 
effects. As a consequence, consumption either 
increases when house prices rise or suffers when 
house prices collapse.12 With supply playing no 
role in dampening price increases, this zero-
elasticity scenario can easily lead to a speculative 
bubble.  
Pure quantity response: In this case, the price 
elasticity of housing is perfectly elastic and an 
increase in demand is immediately met by an 
increase in the housing stock and, hence, housing 
services being provided. As a consequence, 
nominal and real wealth increase in parallel. In 
this case, higher demand mostly triggers an 
investment cycle, (as opposed to the 
consumption cycle of the pure price response). 
Due to the longevity of housing, the main risk 
associated with such a cycle is the possible build-
up of overcapacity.  
The price elasticity of housing supply is therefore 
important in determining the level and volatility 
of house prices. It also systematically influences 
the functioning of the monetary transmission 
mechanisms. In this respect, the euro area could 
find itself in the worst of worlds. While house 
prices and construction activity show a relatively 
high long-term correlation due to common 
trends, in the short to medium-term, rising prices 
may lead to a very low increase in the housing 
stock as a result of low supply elasticity, as 
suggested in Graph 18. Simultaneously, empirical 
evidence points to a low housing wealth effect in 
the euro area, which means that rising prices do 
not trigger much additional consumption either.13  
                                                     
12  This leaves aside possible complications due to 
distributional effects between house owners and house 
buyers and renters (at least as long as a link is maintained 
between rental payments and house prices). 
13  Catte, P., Girouard, N., Price, R. and C., André (2004), 
‘Housing markets, wealth and the business cycle’, OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper No. 394, 7 
December. 
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Large differences within the euro area 
The long-run correlation between construction 
volume and house prices in the euro-area 
countries appears to be very strong. Graph 19 
plots the change in real house prices between 
1999 and 2004 in different euro-area countries 
against the change in the share of the 
construction sector over the same time period, 
suggesting a strong relation between the two 
variables.14  
Graph 19: Changes in house prices and construction 
shares (In % – 1999-2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
However, a strong correlation among two 
parameters does not necessarily imply causality. 
For instance, in countries where there is strong 
population growth, e.g. in Ireland, the housing 
sector share will increase, while due to land or 
other constraints, prices for houses will go up at 
the same time. This simply means that both 
indicators are influenced by the same exogenous 
developments. In addition, the causality does not 
only flow from higher house prices towards 
higher construction. There also exists a negative 
feedback from higher construction to lower 
house prices. The difficulty is therefore to filter 
out the supply elasticity from other interactions. 
Before doing so, it is important to emphasise that 
the housing market of the euro area is far from 
homogeneous, as is evident from Graphs 17 
                                                     
14  The R² of the regression shown in the graph is 0.82, 
which is extremely high for a cross-sectional analysis. 
When the time span of the analysis is shortened to 3 
years, house prices still explain 56% of the variation in 
relative change in construction volumes.  
and 19. In particular, the German situation, 
which is heavily influenced by the post-
unification boom-bust cycle in the construction 
sector, constitutes an important outlier. In 
contrast with developments in the rest of the 
euro area, German house prices and residential 
construction volumes have moved down over 
the last ten years (Graph 20).  
Graph 20: Construction cycle and house price cycle, 
Germany (Deviation from trend in % – 1976-2004)(1) 
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(1) House prices and residential construction are detrended with a 
linear filter. 
Source: Commission services. 
Germany’s size and divergent housing trend also 
entail a substantial aggregation problem for the 
euro area as a whole. Graph 18 shows clearly that 
the euro-area residential construction cycle is no 
longer moving in harmony with the house price 
cycle. However, a completely different picture 
emerges when Germany is excluded from the 
euro-area aggregate. Graph 21 shows that the 
link between house prices and construction 
apparently still holds in that case, without any 
apparent structural break. Since the same link 
(with reverse signs) also holds for Germany 
alone, the observed structural break in Graph 18 
appears to be a statistical artefact caused by 
aggregation. The situation in individual countries 
therefore needs to be closely examined to gain 
any insight into the housing market, even if 
anecdotal evidence suggests a growing link 
among European real estate markets.  
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Graph 21: Construction cycle and house price cycle, 
euro area excluding Germany  
(Deviation from trend in % – 1976-2004) (1) 
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(1) House prices and residential construction are detrended with a 
linear filter.  
Source: Commission services. 
Empirical analysis suggests a relatively low 
supply response 
Table 4 presents a time-series analysis of 
residential construction in eight euro-area 
countries, the UK and the United States. Supply 
is estimated as a function of real house prices. 
Population growth and interest rates are added as 
proxies for supply shifter.15 Changes in real 
house prices in the regression are lagged by one 
year.16 This formulation principally excludes the 
problem of endogeneity, which occurs as house 
prices themselves are negatively influenced by the 
volume of construction activity.17  
The estimated price elasticities vary substantially 
across the euro area, even though the significance 
sometimes differs. Elasticities range between 
zero and 1.4. They are relatively high in Belgium 
                                                     
15  Population developments are used to capture major 
structural shifts in housing growth. Supply is assumed to 
respond to these changes via shifts in activity rather than 
changes in prices. Real interest rates are a proxy for 
capital costs. Suppressing these two additional regressors 
would not change substantially the main conclusions 
presented here.  
16  The exception is the USA, where an equation without a 
time lag yielded the best results. This might be due to 
faster planning procedures and fewer land-use constraints 
than in Europe.  
17  This may not be completely true, because house prices 
may also fall as a result of anticipated construction 
activity.  
and Germany. France, Finland and Ireland have 
a mid-level elasticities. By contrast, the analysis 
shows very low price elasticities for Spain, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Portugal. The supply 
elasticity is zero for the UK, 18 but high for the 
USA. 
A regression of the euro-area aggregate 
(including Germany) yields an elasticity of 0.4. 
This is also the only regression yielding a 
statistically significant structural break in the 
price elasticity in the mid-1990s, confirming the 
existence of an aggregation problem at the euro-
area level. 
In qualitative terms, these results broadly 
confirm the findings of other international 
comparisons. For instance, based on quarterly 
figures for housing starts, Swank et al. (2002)19 
estimate price elasticities of new housing supply 
ranging from a high value of 2.1 for Germany 
over a middling value of 1.1 for France to 0.3 in 
the Netherlands. They also show that the UK 
housing supply is only half as responsive as the 
French housing market, a third as responsive as 
the US housing market, and only a quarter as 
responsive as the German housing market. 
Malpenzzi et al. (2001) arrive at similar findings 
for the UK and the USA.20 
The regressions suggest that house prices play a 
relatively small role in driving construction 
activity in the euro area as a whole. The great 
variations across Member States in house price 
elasticity reflect substantial structural and 
regulatory differences. An important aspect is 
that the elasticity measures only changes in the 
rate at which new housing is provided, which is 
not the same as changes in the overall housing 
supply. Indeed, there are large differences in the 
size of the construction sectors relative to the 
existing housing stock, which could explain 
differences in the observed supply elasticities of 
                                                     
18  In the case of the UK, the regression resulted in a small 
negative but statistically insignificant value.  
19  Swank, J., J. Kakes and A.F. Tiemann (2002), “The 
housing ladder, taxation and borrowing constraints”, De 
Nederlandsche Bank  Staff Reports, N° 9. 
20  Malpenzzi, S. and Maclennan D. (2001), “The price 
elasticity of supply of new residential construction in the 
US and UK”, Journal of Housing Economics, Vol. 10, 278-
306. 
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new housing. This suggests the need for a 
cautious interpretation of the estimated 
elasticities, which would need to be adjusted for 
the different stock-to-flow ratios. After 
adjustment, the estimated response of housing 
stock to house prices in France is identical to that 
in Germany, to give just one example. 
Furthermore, considering that the growth in 
housing stock in Spain is seven times that of, say, 
Germany, and dominated by fundamentals, it is 
not surprising that it is difficult to find a 
statistically significant interaction. 
Other structural factors that influence the supply 
response are land-use restrictions and permit 
procedures. In addition, the supply elasticity is 
influenced by the relative importance of 
government-provided social housing and the 
real-estate development industry. Local land-use 
regulations and slow permit procedures have 
been identified among the reasons for the rigidity 
of housing supply and an important factor 
underlying both the trend rise of house prices 
and the high variability in the UK. Similar factors 
affect house price dynamics in the Netherlands 
and in Spain.21  
Table 5 lists some indicative structural features of 
the housing market, which underline the diversity 
of the housing markets in the euro area. 
However, the interactions among the various 
indicators are too complex to single out a single 
one as a determinant of house-price elasticities. 
                                                     
21 Catte et al. (2004), ibid. 
 
Table 4: Estimated elasticities of new housing supply  
(Endogenous variable: % changes in real investment in residential construction) (1) 
Country House price  Population growth Real interest rate R²adjusted 
Belgium 1.41 
(3.55)) 
2.36 
(0.85) 
-0.02 
(-1.69) 
0.26 
Germany  0.80 
(2.43) 
0.99 
(2.10) 
-0.01 
(-1.81)  
0.30 
France (3) 0.48 
(3.78) 
0.31 
(0.64) 
---- (2) 0.31 
Spain 0.03 
(0.72) 
4.72 
(4.59) 
---- (2) 0.46 
Italy 0.11 
(1.50) 
1.38 
(1.64) 
-0.003 
(-0.94) 
0.19 
Ireland 0.46 
(2.00) 
---- (2) -0.004 
(-0.92) 
0.09 
Netherlands 0.21 
(2.23) 
---- (2) ---- (2) 0.12 
Portugal (3)  0.26 
(1.24) 
---- (2) ---- (2) 0.03 
Finland 0.49 
(3.39) 
---- (2) -0.005 
(-0.97) 
0.30 
Euro Area 0.37 
(2.85) 
0.19 
(0.80) 
-0.009 
(-1.92) 
0.24 
UK   -0.006 
(-0.03) 
---- (2) -0.002 
(-0.36)  
-0.07 
USA 1.47 (4) 
(1.5) 
---- (2) ---- (2) 0.11 
(1) t-values in brackets. Based on annual data from 1974 to 2004. New housing supply = real residential investment; House prices=annual 
% change in nominal house priced deflated by CPI and lagged by 1 year; (except USA) Population = annual % change in population 
between 30 and 44 lagged by 1 year;  interest rate= average of real short and long term rates (lagged by one year).  
(2) Suppressed because of wrong sign.  
(3) Total construction;  
(4) Not lagged. 
Source: Commission services;  ECB; US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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Nor is it clear whether all factors only affect the 
supply side.  
Table 5 : Mortgage and housing market indicators
 Share of 
owner 
occupied 
housing 
(2002) 
Typical 
loan 
term  
(years) 
Typical 
loan-to-
value 
ratios 
Housing 
stock 
(Avg. 
annual gr. 
2000-04) 
Belgium 71 20 83 0.8% 
Germany 42 25-30 67 0.6% 
Greece 83 15 75 na 
Spain 85 15 70 4.0% 
France 55 15 67 1.0% 
Italy 80 15 55 0.2% 
Ireland 77 20 66 8.1% 
Netherlands 53 30 90 0.8% 
Portugal 64 15 83 0.0% 
Finland 58 15-18 75 1.2% 
Source: Catte et al. (2004) ; European Mortgage Federation.  
 
Conclusions 
The rise in house prices over the last ten years in 
the euro area reflects a combination of strong 
demand and a muted supply response. 
Econometric analysis shows that housing supply 
is responding only modestly to changes in prices 
in the euro area as a whole. This low 
responsiveness appears to be linked to structural 
parameters, notably building and land-use 
regulations. There is also evidence that the price 
responsiveness of supply for the euro area has 
decreased since the 1990s and that construction 
activity has remained surprisingly sluggish in 
recent years.  
However, the euro-area housing market is still far 
from homogenous and the price elasticity of 
housing supply varies significantly across 
Member States, being relatively high in countries 
such as Germany and France and much lower in 
Italy, Spain or the Netherlands. The reduction in 
price elasticity of housing in the last ten years for 
the euro-area aggregate appears to be largely 
attributable to Germany, where house prices and 
construction have been strongly depressed by the 
oversupply the followed on the heels of 
unification.  
Clearly, countries can influence the supply 
elasticities through regulatory changes to allow a 
more flexible supply response. This would 
reduce the volatility of house prices but might 
lead to the risks of possible bubble formation 
shifting from private consumption to 
construction investment. 
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Focus 
II. Accumulated household debt – a counterpart to rising house 
prices in the euro area 
A counterpart to the sustained rise in house prices within the euro area in recent years has been the accumulation of household 
debt, much of which has been secured against house purchases. These related phenomena have been facilitated by favourable 
financing conditions, reflecting historically low interest rates and supply-side changes in mortgage markets which have 
expanded access to credit. A rise in the level of debt increases households’ exposure to changes in house prices as well as to 
economic shocks affecting income growth and interest rates. It may also lead to overstretched balance sheets that require a 
period of consolidation and spending restraints. For the euro area as a whole, risks to growth related to household 
indebtedness appear quite low at this juncture. However, developments in household debt have been characterised by 
considerable heterogeneity at Member State level and the situation may be less benign in some Member States where rapid 
debt accumulation has been associated with fast growth in household spending, deteriorating balance sheets and soaring house 
prices. These Member States appear to be more vulnerable to economic shocks such as a rise in interest rates, a correction in 
house prices or a downward revision of domestic growth prospects. 
The steady rise in household indebtedness within 
the euro area in recent years – which contrasts 
with the process of debt consolidation observed 
in the corporate sector – is increasingly a focus 
of attention among analysts and policymakers. 
This focus section reviews the factors which 
have led to the rapid accumulation of debt by 
households since the beginning of the decade 
and assesses the associated risks to economic 
growth in the euro area. Section 1 examines 
recent developments in household debt and their 
likely causes. Section 2 reviews the various 
channels through which high indebtedness may 
affect economic growth. Section 3 then proposes 
an assessment of the current debt situation in the 
euro area and in the euro-area Member States. 
Based on this examination and the channels 
identified earlier, Section 4 discusses a number of 
potential risk factors – of global and euro-
specific origin – to households in the euro area. 
Section 5 concludes.  
1.  Recent developments in household 
debt 
Household indebtedness has increased steadily in 
most Western countries since the mid-1990s. In 
the euro area, the ratio of household debt to 
GDP climbed from 44% in 1995 to 56% in 2004 
(Graph 22). The accumulation of debt was even 
more rapid in countries such as the UK and the 
USA, where the debt to GDP ratio increased by 
about 20-25 pp over the same period.  
Graph 22: Household debt, euro area, UK and USA  
(Ratio to GDP in % – 1995 2004) (1) 
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(1) Euro-area data do not include EL, IE and LU. 
Source: Commission services, US Federal Reserve System. 
Rapid debt accumulation in Western economies 
may be attributed to a combination of 
macroeconomic, demographic and structural 
factors.  
At the macroeconomic level, historically low 
interest rates have been a key driver of credit 
demand. In addition, demand for housing and 
mortgages – which accounts for most of the 
increase in total household lending – has been 
boosted by a stable and low-inflation 
environment.22 In some countries, there is also 
evidence that rapid rises in house prices have 
                                                     
22  High inflation raises the financial burden of a loan in the 
early years of repayment. 
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encouraged borrowing by raising the value of 
collateral and easing credit restrictions.23 
In addition to favourable macroeconomic 
conditions, demographic developments have 
also tended to be supportive of the housing 
market in many countries. Population growth 
and the demographic developments that affect 
the number of households have implications for 
the demand for housing and for mortgages. 
Large immigration flows, falls in the average size 
of households, rises in the share of population of 
household formation age and increasing female 
participation in the labour market all have 
potentially important implications for household 
credit demand.  
Finally, increased household borrowing also 
reflects structural changes both on the supply 
side and the funding side of the mortgage 
markets, which have presented households with 
expanded access to credit for house purchase and 
eased liquidity constraints. Among those changes 
affecting the supply of mortgage financing has 
been the increased availability of: (i) extended 
maturity of contracts, providing borrowers with 
more time to repay a given amount borrowed; 
(ii) higher loan-to-value ratios, opening up 
enlarged borrowing opportunities for borrowers 
with limited capital of their own; (iii) an 
increasing share of variable interest rate loans, 
typically offering lower-cost borrowing when 
compared with longer-term fixed rates; and 
(iv) interest-only loans as well as – in some cases 
– equity withdrawal possibilities, permitting 
households with limited resources to acquire a 
house and enabling house owners to borrow 
against equity acquired in their house. There have 
also been changes on the funding side of the 
mortgage market, including the growing 
availability of both mortgage bonds and debt 
securitisation, which have allowed mortgage 
financing institutions to source their funding 
beyond their retail deposit base. 
                                                     
23  While there is a clear causal relation between credit 
conditions and house prices (better credit conditions fuel 
demand for housing and mortgages and thereby house 
prices), there is also empirical evidence of a reverse effect 
of property prices on credit growth in some countries. 
The potency of this reverse effect is related to structural 
features of the mortgage market. See Tsatsaronis, K. and 
H., Zhu (2004), 'What drives housing price dynamics: 
cross-country evidence', BIS Quarterly Review, March.  
Graph 23: Household debt growth in euro-area Member 
States (average annual growth in %) (1) 
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(1) Data for 2005 refer to MFI debt growth. 
(2) Growth in 2004 instead of 2001-04.  
Source: ECB, Commission services.  
The overall euro-area picture of relatively 
sustained household debt accumulation conceals 
large differences, ranging from a near stagnation 
of household debt in Germany since 2000 to 
rapid credit growth in most other Member States 
(Graph 23). In recent years, household debt 
accumulation has been particularly sustained in 
Spain, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Portugal. The cross-country heterogeneity of 
developments in household indebtedness within 
the euro area reflects several factors.  
First, the adoption of the euro was associated 
with a very substantial downward convergence in 
interest rates and increased access to external 
bank lending in several Member States (notably 
in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal). Over and 
above favourable global liquidity conditions, 
these factors have contributed to a surge in 
household credit in most of the countries 
concerned. 
Second, in some Member States, comparatively 
higher inflation (due to either the so-called 
Balassa-Samuelson effect or different cyclical 
positions) has further depressed real interest 
rates, providing an additional boost to credit 
demand (Graph 24). The pro-cyclical effect of 
real interest rates may have been reinforced by 
the mutual interaction between real interest rates 
and house prices (low real interest rates fuel 
demand for housing, leading to a rise in house 
prices which pushes up growth and inflation via 
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wealth effects and further depresses real interest 
rates).  
Graph 24: Household mortgage debt and real interest 
rates, euro-area Member States (2002-04 – in %) (1) 
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(1) No data for LU. 
(2) Average real short-term interest rates (consumption deflator) 
2002-04. 
(3) Growth in mortgage debt between 2001 and 2004. 
Source: European Mortgage Federation, Commission services.  
Third, demographic developments have been 
more supportive of demand for housing and 
mortgages in some Member States than others 
due, for instance, to significant immigration 
flows (e.g. Ireland and Spain) or faster growth of 
the population of household formation age (e.g. 
Ireland, Spain, Netherlands and France). 
Finally, structural differences in mortgage 
markets and in the fiscal treatment of housing 
have also contributed to the observed dispersion 
of developments in household indebtedness. For 
instance, Member States where mortgages are 
predominantly at variable rates have tended to 
experience faster credit growth in recent years 
(Greece, Spain, Ireland and Italy). There have 
also been cross-country differences in the pace of 
mortgage product innovation and of structural 
change in the mortgage markets.24 In particular, 
some Member States with relatively 
underdeveloped mortgage markets seem to have 
entered a catching-up process and recorded 
comparatively faster credit growth. 
                                                     
24  For a review of recent mortgage product innovation in 
selected countries see OECD (2005), “Recent house price 
developments: the role of fundamentals”, OECD 
Economic Outlook, No. 78, Chapter 3, December. 
2.  The implications of household debt 
for economic growth – reviewing the 
channels  
An increase in household debt is not per se a 
source of concern for economic performance, 
but excessive accumulation of debt can create 
vulnerabilities to adverse shocks. While even the 
accumulation of high levels of debt may simply 
be a sign that households are responding 
optimally to positive changes in their economic 
environment, three main considerations need to 
be taken into account. 
A rapid increase in borrowing may lead 
households to accumulate a higher-than-
desired level of indebtedness, inducing a 
subsequent cut in household spending so as to 
improve their balance sheets. Typically, this 
situation will arise when households overestimate 
their long-term income prospects or their 
capacity to service their accumulated debt.  
• Overestimation of income prospects and 
debt-servicing capacity may be more frequent 
during phases of sustained economic 
upswings or in periods of marked structural 
change. Developments in some EU Member 
States in the 1980s also reveal that phases of 
rapid financial market liberalisation and 
deregulation may raise the risk of a temporary 
build-up of excessively optimistic 
expectations, as economic agents (including 
policymakers) need time to fully understand 
the implications of their changing 
environment.25 
• With respect to underestimation of a future 
debt burden, there are indications that 
households borrowing at variable interest 
rates may tend to form excessively optimistic 
expectations of future interest rate 
                                                     
25  Increasing competition in the banking sector leads to a 
relaxation of credit constraints that fuels domestic 
demand, particularly if macroeconomic policy is slow to 
respond to implications for growth in the short term. The 
associated pick-up in growth may generate excessive 
income expectations and may also be reinforced by rapid 
growth in house prices. These factors seem to have been 
at play in the UK and Nordic countries in the 1980s. See 
Debelle, G. (2004), ‘Macroeconomic implications of 
rising household debt’, BIS Working Paper No. 153, June.  
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developments when monetary policy is 
accommodative.26 
In any event, a period of excessively optimistic 
expectations is typically followed by a period of 
spending retrenchment during which households 
restore overstretched balance sheets by 
restraining their expenditure. 
A higher level of debt makes households more 
vulnerable to economic shocks affecting 
disposable income and interest rates. A rise in the 
overall debt levels may be associated with an 
increase in the share of households for which the 
debt-servicing costs represent a substantial 
portion of disposable income. In that case, an 
unexpected loss in income – especially if it takes 
the form of an increase in unemployment27 – can 
lead to a rapid rise in the number of households 
forced to raise their level of precautionary 
savings because they face a high probability of 
default. A related argument is that a high level of 
indebtedness restricts the possibility of using 
further credit for consumption smoothing and 
therefore raises the sensitivity of consumption to 
fluctuations in disposable income. A higher debt 
level also means greater exposure to unexpected 
changes in interest rates. The size of this impact 
and the speed of its transmission will vary 
substantially across countries, depending on the 
sensitivity of debt-servicing costs to changes in 
interest rates. In countries where mortgages are 
predominantly at variable rates, households will 
be directly exposed to an increase in interest 
rates. In countries where rates are mostly fixed, 
banks will bear more of the exposure to the 
interest-rate risk, depending on their financing 
structure.  
A higher level of debt may be associated with 
higher exposure to changes in house prices. 
A recent study has identified a strong cross-
country correlation between the strength of 
                                                     
26  For evidence on the UK mortgage market see Miles, D. 
(2004), ‘The UK mortgage market: taking a longer term 
view – Final Report and recommendations’, HM 
Treasury, March.  
27  A rise in unemployment usually means a large drop in 
income for a limited number of households. Other 
possible sources of a change in income (e.g. increased 
taxation, fluctuations in wages rates) tend to be less 
concentrated on a small part of the population. 
housing-wealth effects on consumption and the 
size of the mortgage market.28 Such a correlation 
may partly reflect a causal link. A fall in house 
prices will entail an increase in the probability of 
default for heavily-indebted households and an 
increase in precautionary savings. To the extent 
that an increase in the aggregate level of 
indebtedness is associated with a rise in the share 
of heavily-indebted households, it will also mean 
higher sensitivity to house price fluctuations. 
More generally, mortgage markets tend to be 
larger in those countries where they are more 
liberalised and the correlation is also likely to be 
an indication that the size of housing-wealth 
effects depends on the degree of sophistication 
of mortgage markets. 
3.  Assessing household borrowing trends 
in the euro area 
The euro area as a whole 
Debt and balance-sheet data would tend to ease 
any immediate concern about the level of 
household indebtedness in the euro area as a 
whole. Although the euro-area household debt 
ratio has climbed significantly in recent years, it 
remains well below the corresponding ratios in 
the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, the debt-to-financial-asset ratio has 
risen only moderately (Graph 25) and debt-
servicing costs have actually been declining as a 
proportion of disposable income (Graph 26).29 
Finally, survey evidence suggests that the bulk of 
the debt is held by high-income households who 
also tend to enjoy a relatively sound financial 
position.30 
                                                     
28  Catte, P., Girouard, N., Price, R. and C., André (2004), 
‘Housing markets, wealth and the business cycle’, OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper No. 394, 
7 December.  
29  Ideally, the assessment of household balance sheets 
should not be restricted to financial assets and should 
include developments in tangible assets such as the 
housing stock. Unfortunately, data on tangible assets are 
not available for the euro area as a whole.  
30  European Central Bank (2005), “Financial stability 
review”, December. 
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Graph 25: Household debt to financial assets, euro area, 
UK, USA (In % – 1995-2004) (1) 
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(1) Euro-area data do not include EL, IE and LU. 
Source: Commission services, US Federal Reserve System.  
 
Graph 26: Interest paid by households as a share of 
disposable income, euro area (In % – 1995-2004) (1) 
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(1) Excluding IE and LU. 
Source: Commission services.  
Analysis of the real counterparts of debt 
accumulation is an important part of the 
assessment of an economy's exposure to debt. If 
credit growth has fostered a spending boom and 
an expansion in real activity, a mere stabilisation 
of indebtedness could have a significant negative 
bearing on economic growth.  
However, the exposure of economic growth to a 
change in the pace of debt accumulation appears 
fairly limited in the euro area as a whole. There is 
no evidence that households have borrowed 
substantially to consume or that the build-up of 
household debt has spurred a boom in residential 
construction. A moderate decline in the savings 
ratio accompanied the increase in mortgage 
indebtedness in the late 1990s, but household 
consumption has remained fairly sluggish since 
2000, despite a continued rise in indebtedness 
(Graph 27). Similarly, the build-up of mortgage 
debt since the mid-1990s has been associated 
with only moderate growth in euro-area 
residential construction. For a variety of 
structural reasons, the euro-area residential 
construction sector is characterised by the slow 
and relatively weak response of supply to 
changes in demand (see also the section on 'The 
weak response of housing supply to surging 
prices' in this issue). 
Graph 27: Mortgage debt and household savings, euro 
area (In % – 1995-2004) (1) 
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(1) As a share of disposable income – EU12 excluding IE and LU. 
(2) As a share of GDP – EU12 excluding PT. 
(3) EU12 excluding AT and PT. 
Source: Commission services, European Mortgage Federation.  
On this basis, it would seem that the euro-area 
household balance sheet is relatively robust and 
that, in any case, an adverse shock to disposable 
income or debt servicing costs would have only a 
limited impact on GDP growth. 
The euro-area Member States 
The assessment of developments in household 
indebtedness is less sanguine in some of the 
euro-area Member States. The euro-area average 
hides a large dispersion in household 
indebtedness across the Member States with debt 
to disposable income figures roughly at 100% or 
above in Germany, Spain, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Portugal (Graph 28). In 2005, 
debt of monetary and financial institutions (MFI) 
grew by more than 25% in Greece, Spain and 
Ireland. Other countries recorded sharp credit 
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growth in earlier periods, e.g. the Netherlands 
and Portugal during the second half of the 1990s.  
Graph 28: Household debt-to-GDP and to disposable 
income ratios, euro-area Member States  
(In % – 2004) (1) 
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(1) MFI debt for EL, IE and LU – 2003 debt to gross disposable 
income data for IE and PT 
Source: Commission services, ECB and Irish Central Bank.  
 
Graph 29: Household total-debt-to-financial-asset ratio, 
euro-area Member States (In % – 1995-2004) (1) 
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
BE DE ES FR IT NL AT PT FI
1995 2000 2004  
(1) No data for EL, IE and LU. 
Source: Commission services.  
Historically low interest rates have allowed 
households to contain their debt servicing costs. 
National account data indicate that the ratio of 
interest paid by households to their disposable 
income has decreased in the past few years in all 
Member States, except for Greece. Nevertheless, 
in some of the Member States for which data are 
available, the increase in indebtedness has led to 
a deterioration in household balance sheets. For 
example, a sharp rise in the debt-to-asset ratio 
has been witnessed in Spain, the Netherlands and 
Portugal (Graph 29). In this context, it should be 
noted that there are no data available on debt-to-
asset ratios for households in Ireland, Greece 
and Luxembourg so it is difficult to assess the 
full implications of debt accumulation for 
balance sheets in these three countries. 
Graph 30: Changes in household total-debt-to-GDP 
ratio and savings ratio, euro-area Member States  
(In % – 1995-2004) (1) 
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(1) Debt data are not available for EL, IE and LU. Savings data are 
not available for IE and LU.  
Source: Commission services.  
In some Member States, the rise in household 
debt would appear to have been partly used to 
finance private consumption (Graph 30). Greece, 
the Netherlands and Portugal all recorded a 
substantial decline in their savings ratio during 
the second half of the 1990s (no data are 
available for Ireland). In the Netherlands and 
Portugal, the consumption boom was followed 
by a period of consolidation in the early 2000s 
during which the savings ratio experienced a 
partial rebound. In 2004 or 2005, however, the 
ratio edged down again in both countries. In 
Greece, the savings ratio pursued its downward 
course in the early 2000s and has stabilised 
since.31 This would indirectly suggest that private 
consumption growth in these Member States 
could be at risk in the event of a reversal of 
recent trends in credit growth. 
                                                     
31  In contrast, the household savings ratio in Spain has 
moved more in line with the euro-area average during 
most of the past 10 years as the consumption boom in 
that country was mainly financed by strong income 
growth on the back of rapid improvements in the labour 
market. However, the Spanish savings ratio dropped by 3 
percentage points in the past two years, when the overall 
euro-area savings ratio remained nearly stable. 
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In general, there is little evidence to suggest that 
residential construction in euro-area Member 
States has benefited significantly from the 
increase in household debt and so there would be 
little prospect of a sharp decline in activity in the 
event of a slowdown in mortgage credit growth. 
However, Spain and Ireland, where the housing 
sector has made a significant contribution to 
economic growth in recent years, may be 
exceptions in this respect (Graph 31). 
Graph 31: Residential construction, euro-area Member 
States (Average annual contribution to GDP growth in % – 
1995-2004) (1) 
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(1) No data for PT.  
Source: Commission services.  
While residential construction may not have 
benefited generally from growth in mortgage 
credit, a major counterpart has been rapidly-
rising house prices in several Member States. 
Fast-growing mortgage lending in a context of 
inelastic construction supply has resulted in 
double-digit rates of increase in house prices in 
several Member States, peaking at an annual rate 
of about 18% in Ireland (1998/2000), 14% in 
Spain (2003/4), 14% in the Netherlands 
(1998/2000), 9% in Greece (2001/2002), and 
11% in France (2003/4). The inflation in house 
prices in several Member States is unprecedented 
in terms of size and duration and there is a risk 
that housing markets may be overvalued relative 
to historical norms. A notable exception is 
Portugal, where house prices have risen at a 
moderate pace despite a period of rapid 
expansion in household credit in the late 1990s. 
House prices in Germany and Austria have 
clearly under-performed the euro-area average 
and this trend mirrors a relatively subdued pace 
of credit growth in the two countries.  
Graph 32: Real house prices, euro-area Member States 
(Annual average changes in % – 1995-2004)  
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(1) 1997 only in the case of FR.  
Source: ECB, European Mortgage Federation for LU, Commission 
services.  
In sum, while the aggregate indebtedness of 
households in the euro area is not a cause for 
concern, evidence suggests a need for vigilance in 
some euro-area Member States where 
households have accumulated debt at an 
exceptionally rapid pace. In these Member States, 
the combination of rapid debt accumulation, 
weakened balance sheets, decreasing savings 
ratios and soaring house prices would tend to 
heighten the vulnerability of households to 
adverse shocks. Possible sources of such shocks 
are examined in the next section. 
4.  Risk factors associated with high 
household indebtedness in some euro-
area Member States  
In identifying possible adverse shocks to highly 
indebted households in some euro-area Member 
States, the main focus is on likely developments 
in interest rates, economic growth (as a 
determinant of disposable income) and the 
housing market.  
Revised expectations of interest rates and 
economic growth  
While the outlook for the euro-area economy is 
the brightest for several years, the extent of 
current financial imbalances in the global 
economy presents a continuing risk to a 
sustainable recovery. The low level of short-term 
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interest rates and the global decline in benchmark 
long-term interest rates to historically low levels 
has been accompanied by an even greater decline 
in risk premiums, raising concern that an investor 
search for yield in an environment of ample 
global liquidity may have resulted in widespread 
mispricing of risk. If risk has been mispriced by 
the markets, the current constellation of global 
and euro-area interest rates would be vulnerable 
to an abrupt change in investor sentiment, 
particularly if global liquidity conditions were to 
tighten further.  
While the near-term prospect of an abrupt rise in 
interest rates is low, the possibility cannot be 
ruled out entirely. Financial markets remain 
concerned about the US external deficit and the 
associated risk of disorderly adjustment in the US 
dollar exchange rate. If interest rates were to 
move sharply higher as imbalances unwind, the 
prospects for growth in the global economy – 
including the euro-area economy – would be 
undermined and euro-area households could be 
hit by the twin effects of higher-than-expected 
debt servicing costs and lower-than-expected 
growth in their disposable income. 
Irrespective of developments in the global 
economy, assessment of risks to interest rates 
and economic growth must also take account of 
special circumstances within the euro area. In 
several Member States, euro adoption was 
associated with a downward convergence in 
interest rates and better access to external bank 
lending. These factors have contributed to a 
surge in household credit often reinforced by 
pro-cyclical movement in real interest rates. 
While this phenomenon reflects rational inter-
temporal smoothing on the part of economic 
agents, the consequent rise in household debt has 
been unusually sharp and could be an indication 
of overly optimistic growth expectations that 
would leave the Member States vulnerable to a 
domestically-generated slowdown in growth. 
Rapid cyclical growth – typically associated with 
rapid financial balance sheet deterioration and 
household spending booms – which is mistaken 
as a change in permanent income tends to be 
associated with credit misallocation on a large 
scale. 
Correction in house prices  
In a central scenario of sustained recovery in the 
euro-area economy, a gradual cooling in housing 
markets seems the most likely outcome in the 
medium term, but important risk factors remain 
linked to the specific nature of the current phase 
of increasing house prices. 
First, house prices in several euro-area Member 
States are experiencing their longest phase of 
increase since the 1970s and have reached 
historical highs. These features suggest that the 
associated expansion in mortgage credit may 
extend to a larger-than-usual share of the 
population, possibly altering the overall risk 
profile of household debtors. As house price 
inflation has far exceeded the growth rate in 
disposable income, it is likely that the leverage of 
individual household debtors has risen 
significantly. In such circumstances, there is a 
risk that, although survey evidence suggests that 
the bulk of mortgage debt in the euro area is held 
by households with a sound financial position, 
the “marginal” mortgage taker could be in a 
more vulnerable financial situation. 
Second, typical indicators of house price 
developments could understate the extent of 
overvaluation in localised “hot spots”. These 
indicators are normally constructed on a national 
basis and therefore might not reflect the huge 
price rises recorded in agglomeration centres. In 
such circumstances, house prices in some urban 
areas might be more out of line with historical 
norms than suggested by official figures and 
consequently more prone to correction. 
Third, while many valid arguments can be 
brought forward in defence of recent house price 
and credit developments – including population 
growth, catch-up factors, financial liberalisation, 
etc. – one cannot exclude the possibility of 
excessive optimism among households, implying 
an overestimation of long-term income prospects 
and an underestimation of future debt burdens. 
A recent review of available estimates of 
fundamental price levels for a limited number of 
countries by the OECD suggests possible house  
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Box 2: Debt accumulation and growth – the recent Dutch experience 
  
The Dutch economy posts the highest level of household indebtedness in the euro area and has experienced one of 
the fastest debt accumulations in Europe since the mid-1990s. The present box reviews these developments and, in 
particular, households’ response to the period of weak growth since 2001.  
 
1. Developments in household debt since the mid-1990s 
 
Since the early nineties the indebtedness of Dutch households has grown substantially from below 30% of GDP in 
1991 to over 80% of GDP in 2005 (see left panel of next chart). Almost 90% of this debt is mortgage debt. Several 
factors explain the substantial increase in indebtedness.  
 
Total household and mortgage debt,  
the Netherlands (In % – 1992-2005)  
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Sources: De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), Het Kadaster. 
(1) Households without mortgages are excluded.  
Sources: DNB, Het Kadaster, VROM. 
 
Decreasing real interest rates as well as the interplay between surging house prices (which have tripled since the early 
nineties) and mortgage growth are important but do not tell the full story. A major role has been played by the 
Dutch fiscal regime that permits full tax deductibility of (most) mortgage interest payments at the marginal tax rate. 
The appearance of new mortgage products that take advantage of tax deductibility(1) stimulated the withdrawal of 
mortgage equity. Finally, the loosening of lending criteria, which has been attributed to stronger competition 
between mortgage providers, boosted the growth of mortgage debt in the late nineties. All these factors have led to 
an increase in the Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratio of first-time buyers on the housing market (see right panel of chart 
above). In recent years the Dutch government has taken some steps to reduce the generosity of the fiscal regime for 
mortgages. 
 
Dutch household savings ratio and residential 
construction (In % – 1995-2005) 
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Source: European Commission Autumn 2005 Forecasts. Sources: Eurostat. 
 
Turning to the counterparts of household debt, rapid credit growth fuelled a surge in household spending in the late 
1990s as shown by a marked decline of the savings ratio and sustained demand for residential construction (see left 
panel of chart above). However, given supply rigidities, the latter has tended to be reflected more in rising prices 
than in real activity. The period of buoyant spending was then followed by a period of consolidation. The savings 
ratio rebounded strongly in 2001, partly in response to falling stock prices, and the share of residential construction 
in GDP experienced a temporary decline in 2002-03.  
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Regarding balance sheets, robust consumption and residential spending led to a marked deterioration of households' 
balance sheets in the late 1990s. Households' net financial surplus (i.e. the acquisition of financial assets minus the 
incurrence of financial liabilities) decreased steadily over the period, turning briefly negative in 2000. It recovered in 
the early 2000s although to a relatively low level (see right panel of previous chart). After a sharp increase in 2001-02, 
the ratio of households' debt to financial assets continued to increase in 2003-04 although at a slower pace. 
  
2. Households' response to the recent period of slow growth  
 
In recent years, the Netherlands have been an interesting case study of households' behaviour in the presence of a 
combination of high debt and weak economic growth. Since 2001, Dutch households have responded to 
deteriorating income and wealth conditions by reining in consumption and engaging in a relatively modest 
restructuring of their balance sheets while borrowing further but at a slower pace. 
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Spending cuts. The persistent weakness of 
consumption since the beginning of the decade is not 
necessarily evidence that spending has been 
constrained by excessive debt accumulation. It could 
indeed reflect a normal response by households to 
deteriorating economic growth conditions. In order to 
test this possibility, a standard consumption function 
(where debt plays no role) was estimated. Results 
suggest that Dutch consumption was stronger than 
expected on the basis of developments in wealth and 
income in the late 1990s, with a gap of more than 2% 
at the end of 2000. In contrast, it has been weaker 
than expected since 2001 with a maximum gap of 
above 1% at the end of 2003. Although these results 
must be interpreted with caution, they could be 
evidence that Dutch consumers have gone through a 
period of 'excessive optimism' in the late 1990s and a 
period of consolidation since then. 
(1) As predicted by a consumption function relating consumption to 
disposable. income, financial wealth, and housing wealth. 
Source: NIESR, European Commission. 
 
Balance-sheet restructuring. Dutch households have adjusted to weak growth conditions by raising their financial 
surplus and engaging in some balance sheet restructuring. These efforts, however, have remained relatively modest. 
On the one hand, households' net financial assets (i.e. financial assets minus borrowing) have increased again since 
2003 and there are also indications that households have modified the composition of their financial wealth by 
accumulating more liquid assets. On the other hand, the financial vulnerability of some groups of households seems 
to have increased noticeably. For instance, estimates of the Dutch Central Bank suggest that a large share of 
homeowners in the lower income ranges would be left with mortgage in excess of their home value if house prices 
were to drop by 20%.(2) In addition, households seem to have been slow to lock in low interest rates. Debt is 
predominantly of a fixed rate nature in the Netherlands but households have first reacted to the decline in interest 
rates by opting for variable rates or rates fixed for a short term. Although the trend has been reversed since 2005, 
Dutch households seem relatively more exposed to fluctuations in interest rates than a few years ago.  
 
Overall, the weak cyclical conditions prevailing since 2001 have not been sufficient to trigger a major debt 
consolidation in the Netherlands. However, high debt seems to have exerted some pressure on consumption in the 
past few years as households have corrected some spending overshooting of the late 1990s. Furthermore, the latest 
downturn was somewhat atypical as it was associated with historically-low real interest rates (which have eased the 
burden of the debt considerably) and steady growth in house prices (which has allowed to households to borrow 
against rising equity). The exposure of the economy to changes in interest rates and house prices has increased in 
recent years and high household debt could prove to be a more substantial drag on household spending in case of 
simultaneous negative shocks on interest rates and house prices. 
 
(1) Debt is often not paid back until maturity but endowments are made on savings and investments accounts to pay back the debt. 
This is a major reason why Dutch debt ratios are higher than elsewhere. 
 
(2) De Nederlandsche Bank (2005), ‘Confidence, happiness and financial situation of households’, Quarterly Bulletin, September, 
pp. 55-64. 
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price overvaluations in a few euro-area Member 
States.32 
Finally, even a mere stabilisation of house prices 
at their prevailing high level could, in some 
countries, entail a significant downshift in 
economic growth as past gains in housing wealth 
wane. The experience of the Netherlands is 
revealing in this context (see Box 2). 
5.  Conclusion  
A counterpart of the sustained rise in house 
prices within the euro area in recent years has 
been the accumulation of household debt, much 
of which has been secured against house 
purchases.  
While the relevant indicators suggest that 
household indebtedness is not currently a major 
concern at the level of the euro area, the situation 
may be more worrying in some euro-area 
Member States where debt levels can be 
considered to be high and where rapid debt 
accumulation has been associated with weakened 
balance sheets, fast growth in household 
spending and soaring house prices. Moreover, 
the number of Member States in this situation 
could well expand if current trends were to 
persist. Highly-indebted households in these 
Member States are  
                                                     
32 OECD (2005), ibid. 
vulnerable to a rise in interest rates which may 
imply a heavier-than-expected debt servicing 
burden, slower economic growth which may 
imply a lower-than-expected increase in 
disposable income, and a correction in house 
prices which may impact severely on their net 
financial wealth.  
On the basis of the current outlook for economic 
growth and interest rates, none of these risks can 
be said to have a high probability in the short 
term. Nevertheless, the possibility of a less 
benign scenario is not negligible in light of 
persistent global financial imbalances and the 
extent to which house prices in some Member 
States have departed from historical norms. 
Furthermore, potential economic costs 
associated with these risks are likely to be high. 
Such considerations are particularly relevant in 
the context of countries participating in a 
monetary union, where the possibility of 
overshooting the optimal debt level is increased 
by the pro-cyclical real interest rate channel 
which can itself be reinforced by developments 
in house prices. Furthermore, euro-area 
monetary policy will not be able to respond to 
the effects of expenditure retrenchment at the 
Member State level, unless such a retrenchment 
shows effects for the euro area as a whole.  
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http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2006/interim_forecast_0206_en.p
df 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 3. 2005 
Public finances in EMU –2005 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/publicfinance_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 5. 2005 
Economic Forecasts, Autumn 2005 - 2007: growth picks up 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/forecasts_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 6. 2005 
The EU Economy 2005 Review 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/the_eu_economy_review_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No.21. November 2005 
Responding to the challenges of globalisation 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers21_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No.22. January 2006 
Report on the Lisbon National Reform Programmes 2005 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers22_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ENLARGEMENT PAPERS. No.25. August 2005 
2005 Fiscal notifications of acceding and candidate countries: overview and assessment 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/enlargement_papers/elp25_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ENLARGEMENT PAPERS. No.26. November 2005 
Progress towards meeting the economic criteria for accession: 2005 Country assessment   
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/enlargement_papers/elp26_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. SPECIAL REPORT. No. 4. 2005 
The 2005 EPC projections of age-related expenditure (2004-2050) for the EU-25 Member States: underlying 
assumptions and projection methodologies  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2005/eespecialreport0405_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. SPECIAL REPORT. No. 1. 2006 
The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU25 Member States on pensions, health 
care, long-term care, education and unemployment transfers (2004-2050)   
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2006/eespecialreport0106_en.htm 
2. Analytical documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 236  
Giuseppe Carone, Declan Costello, Nuria Diez Guardia, Gilles Mourre, Bartosz Przywara, Aino Salomaki 
(Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
The economic impact of ageing populations in the EU25 Member States 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers236_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 239.  
Alfonso Arpaia, Declan Costello,Gilles Mourre and Fabiana Pierini (Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs) 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area I/2006 
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Tracking labour market reforms in the EU Member States: an overview of reforms in 2004 based on the 
LABREF database 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers239_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 240.  
Christian Gayer (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) and Julien Genet (Hendyplan, Brussels) 
Using factor models to construct composite indicators from BCS data - a comparison with European 
Commission confidence indicators 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers240_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 241.  
Marco Buti (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Will the new stability and growth pact succeed? An economic and political perspective 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers241_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 242.  
Alexander Hijzen (GEP, University of Nottingham), Holger Görg (GEP, University of Nottingham and DIW 
Berlin) and Miriam Manchin (Tinbergen Institute, Rotterdam University) 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the role of trade costs 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers242_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 243.  
Rachel Griffith, Rupert Harrison and Helen Simpson Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) 
The link between product market reform,  innovation and EU  macroeconomic performance 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers243_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 244 
Rainer Nitsche (CRA International) Paul Heidhues (University of Bonn and CEPR) 
Study on methods to analyse the impact of state aid on competition 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers244_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 245  
Catarina Dantas Machado Rosa and Kristiina Raade (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Profitability of venture capital investment in Europe and the United States 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers245_en.htm 
3. Regular publications  
Euro area GDP indicator (Indicator-based forecast of quarterly GDP growth in the euro area) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/euroareagdp_en.htm 
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the European 
Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early assessment 
of the cyclical situation) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessclimate_en.htm 
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/key_euro_area/keyeuroarea_en.htm 
Monetary condition index MCI  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/monetaryconditions_en.htm 
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, the 
maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/bondmarkets_en.htm 
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/priceandcostcompetiteveness_en.htm 
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V. Key indicators for the euro area 
 
1 Output 2002 2003 2004 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -12 -11 -5 -7 -6 -7 -5 -4 -2 
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch -0.7 0.5 2.0 -0.2 -0.7 1.4 0.2 0.0  
  2002 2003 2004 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch    0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.3  
2 Private consumption 2002 2003 2004 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -11 -18 -14 -15 -13 -13 -11 -11 -10 
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.1 0.1 0.2 -0.7 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.8  
  2002 2003 2004 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 0.6 1.1 1.6 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.2  
3 Investment 2002 2003 2004 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 81.2 80.7 81.6 82.1 81.9 81.1 80.9 81.1 81.7 
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch -2.0 0.9 2.3 0.6 0.2 1.0 1.1 0.8  
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.5  
4 Labour market 2002 2003 2004 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.2 8.4 8.9 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3  
   2002 2003 2004 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6   
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 3.8 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.8 2.4 
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.9 2.5 2.2 1.9 2.6 2.2 2.1   
5 International transactions  2002 2003 2004 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -22 -24 -13 -17 -15 -14 -11 -11 -9 
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 125 132        
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 776.9 1038.6 1142.1 107.3 104.4 108.2 108.7   
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 781.6 970.4 1069.1 105.1 105.4 107.3 111.1   
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR -4.7 68.2 73.0 2.2 -1.0 0.8 -2.4   
   2002 2003 2004 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 2.1 0.6 5.9 0.4 -0.9 2.0 3.4 0.5  
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 0.5 2.6 6.1 1.4 -1.5 2.3 3.1 0.9  
   2002 2003 2004 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 44.9 18.1 42.4 -2.2 -7.4 -9.5 -4.4 -3.3  
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -11.0 -18.4 -39.7 -1.7 -6.4 -12.9 -5.3 5.1  
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 64.4 -9.4 39.0 30.3 -6.6 -34.7 -13.8 -38.2  
6 Prices  2002 2003 2004 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.3 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 2.5 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 1.7 1.6 2.3 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.7 5.3  
 Import prices6.4 Ann. % ch 97.9 102.5 97.2 109.1 108.9 109.5    
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2002 2003 2004 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 3.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 4.8 4.1 4.1 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75 2.25 2.00 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 3053 2420 2805 3352 3344 3405 3548 3627 3744 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.6 7.8 5.9 8.2 8.0 7.6 7.5   
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 7.7 5.0 6.0 8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.7  
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 0.95 1.13 1.24 1.23 1.20 1.18 1.19 1.21 1.19 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 95.1 106.4 109.8 108.5 108.2 107.6 107.8 108.7 108.2 
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Volume, 1998=100, seasonally adjusted CPB 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excl. intra euro-area trade, fob, seasonally and working day adj. Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excl. intra euro-area trade, cif, seasonally and working day adj. Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excl. intra euro-area trade, fob-cif, seasonally and working day adj. Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions;  ECB 
5.9 Direct investment (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Ecowin 
7.2 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Ecowin 
7.3 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Ecowin 
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Ecowin 
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7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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